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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 05-1242
________________
LIONEL S. LAWRENCE,
                     Appellant
   v.
F.C. KERBECK & SONS
____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civ. No. 03-cv-00113)
District Judge: Honorable Robert B. Kugler 
_______________________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 15, 2005
Before:   SLOVITER, BARRY and FISHER, Circuit Judges
(Filed:   June 16, 2005)
_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM
Appellant, Lionel S. Lawrence, appeals from the District Court’s order granting
appellee’s motion for summary judgment.  For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm. 
2Lawrence was hired as an auto detailer by F.C. Kerbeck & Sons (“Kerbeck”) in
July 2001.  On August 29, 2001, he quit this job based on an argument he had with a
manager regarding his paycheck, during which the manager made a derogatory racial
comment.  In January 2003, Lawrence brought this action under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, alleging that he was harassed based on his race
and that he was forced to quit his job because management was not going to rectify the
harassment.  Kerbeck filed a motion for summary judgment, which was granted.
We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary
review over the District Court’s order granting the motion for summary judgment. See
Coolspring Stone Supply, Inc. v. Am. States Life Ins. Co., 10 F.3d 144, 146 (3d Cir.
1993).  A grant of summary judgment will be affirmed if our review reveals that “there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).  “We review the facts in the light
most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was entered.”  Coolspring,
10 F.3d at 146. 
To establish a claim under Title VII based on an intimidating or offensive work
environment, a plaintiff must show: “(1) that he or she suffered intentional discrimination
because of race; (2) the discrimination was pervasive and regular; (3) the discrimination
detrimentally affected the plaintiff; (4) the discrimination would detrimentally affect a
reasonable person of the same race in that position; and (5) the existence of respondeat
superior liability.”  See Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental Corp., 85 F.3d 1074, 1081 (3d Cir.
31996).  In employing this analysis a court must evaluate the frequency of the conduct, its
severity, whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, and whether it unreasonably
interferes with an employee’s work performance.  See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510
U.S. 17, 23 (1993).  Title VII is not violated by “[m]ere utterance of an . . . epithet which
engenders offensive feelings in an employee” or by mere “discourtesy or rudeness,”
unless so severe or pervasive as to constitute an objective change in the conditions of
employment.  See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787 (1998) (citations
omitted).
Lawrence confronted Brian Martin, a manager at Kerbeck, because Lawrence
believed his paycheck did not accurately reflect his work.  Martin, who was in charge of
calculating the payroll in the absence of the regular manager, acknowledged that he had
made an error in his calculations.  An argument ensued, during which Martin made a
racial remark.  Lawrence acknowledged that he did not have regular contact with Martin
and that the altercation over the payroll was an isolated incident.  Although Martin’s
alleged comment was disrespectful and inexcusable, we agree with the District Court that
Lawrence cannot show a hostile work environment based on this one isolated incident.  
The District Court also properly granted Kerbeck’s motion for summary judgment
regarding Lawrence’s claim of constructive discharge.  As discussed above, the
discrimination alleged in this matter was limited to an isolated incident that could not
establish working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable person subject to them
would resign.  See Goss v. Exxon Office Sys. Co., 747 F.2d 885, 888 (3d Cir. 1984). 
Furthermore, Lawrence failed to point to any evidence that Kerbeck knowingly permitted
the conduct at issue.  Id.  
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order.
